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Abstract   
 
The magnitude and complexity of the different processes of decentralization that took place 
around the world in the last five decades, involving all types of states (unitary and federal, 
as well), has challenged the concepts and the traditional distinction among the forms of the 
States. Therefore, to get a more complete and comprehensive idea of the whole phenomenon 
it is necessary to return to a theoretical discussion about decentralization and this requires 
also comparative studies between federal countries and unitary countries. With this 
background, the aim of this paper is twofold: first, it discusses some concepts surrounding the 
idea of decentralization and the different aspect it encompasses; second, it measures and 
compares institutional and fiscal decentralization in two countries with very different 
institutional settings, Argentina and Denmark, through six indicators, in order to explore some 
causal explanations of the role of subnational units in the process of decentralization.   
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Comparing Fiscal (De)Centralization and Multilevel Governments in 
Different Institutional Settings: A comparative study of Argentina and 
Denmark (2000-2010)1 
 
 
Cristian Altavilla 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Decentralization of functions and competences from central governments to 
subnational units (intermediate and/or local levels) has been a worldwide trend in the 
last decades. Most of the countries in Europe and Latin America have experienced a 
strong decentralization process. These processes, however, have not been uniform in 
all countries, acquiring different forms in different countries and within a same 
country over the years. Most significantly, decentralization has occurred in different 
institutional settings, involving not only federal states, but also traditionally unitary 
states.  
Therefore, a comparative study between federal countries and unitary countries is 
required. The different processes of decentralization (political, administrative, fiscal, 
spatial, etc.) around the world, involving even traditionally unitary countries, make it 
difficult to distinguish between decentralized-unitary countries and federal countries. 
Decentralization, then, is a concept that has transcended the theoretical boundaries 
between unitary states and federal states. The question of how different federal and 
unitary constitutional arrangements are in practice arises: “Even in unitary states 
central governments are rarely as autonomous as the formal institutional set-up might 
indicate. They depend on the resources of actors in their surroundings for political 
support, information, expertise or implementation of policies. Formal institutions are 
 
1 This work is the result of a postdoctoral research stay at the Institut for Statskundskab, Aarhus Universitet, Denmark 
(May-July 2016) with a Coimbra Group Scholarship. A preliminary version of this work was presented as a draft 
paper at the 2016 Public Management Research Conference organized by the Public Management Research 
Association (PMRA) and the Institut for Statskundskab, Aarhus Universitet, June 22-24, 2016, Aarhus, Denmark 
and at the 6th Graduate Student Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), held in 
Tartu University, Estonia, 10-13 July. I thank my colleagues from Aarhus University who provided insight and 
expertise that greatly assisted the research, although they may not agree with all of the interpretations and 
conclusions of this paper. I especially thank Peter Mortensen and Jens Blom-Hansen for their comments that greatly 
improved the manuscript. I also thank Steven Levitsky (Harvard University) for his insights and suggestions 
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underpinned or supplanted by informal policy networks in which central government 
actors interact with actors in their surroundings in order to formulate and implement 
policies”2. In federal countries, in turn, the opposite may occur: “In fact, it may be 
that subnational units in federal systems more often underutilize their constitution-
making competency than they overutilize it.”3 
Being aware that decentralization not necessarily raises the power of subnational 
governments in all cases, as commonly thought4, and beyond normative considerations 
regarding fiscal decentralization5, this paper focuses on the question regarding the 
degree in which fiscal decentralization has occurred in countries with different 
institutional settings. This raises the following research questions: to which extent or 
degree has fiscal decentralization occurred? How has fiscal decentralization operated, 
and which outcomes have been achieved in different institutional settings? To which 
extent have the different process of fiscal decentralization increased the degree of 
fiscal autonomy of subnational governments? 
With these questions in mind, the paper intends to compare two different 
countries: Argentina and Denmark. Subnational units in Argentina and Denmark 
operate within different political, economic and legal frameworks. Denmark, like the 
rest of the Scandinavian countries, has decentralized to such a degree that many 
scholars lump it together with federal states, “because their local governments absorb 
such high shares of total public expenditure (Ter-Minassian 1997; Fossati and Panella 
1999; Wellisch 2000)”.6 Still, Denmark remains a unitary country according to its 
 
2 Blom-Hansen, Jens (1999) “Policy-Making in Central-Local Government Relations: Balancing Local Autonomy, 
Macroeconomic Control, and Sectoral Policy Goals”, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 19, Issue 03, Sep., pp 237-264, 
p. 238.  
3 Tarr, Alan (2007) “Subnational Constitutional space: An Agenda for Research”, unpublished paper delivered at 
the VIIth World Congress of the International Association of Constitutional Law, Athens, Greece, June 11-15, 
available at: www.camlaw.rutgers.edu/statecn/, p. 18.  
4 See Falleti, Tulia (2005) “A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Comparative 
Perspective”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 3, August, pp. 327-346; Cetrángolo, Oscar and Juan 
P. Jiménez (2004) “Las Relaciones entre Niveles de Gobierno en Argentina”, Revista de la CEPAL, No 84, 
December. pp. 117-134. Santiago de Chile: ONU-CEPAL.  
5 See Tiebout, Charles (1956) “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures” The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 64, 
No. 5, (Oct., 1956), pp. 416-424; Oates, Wallace (1972) Fiscal Federalism, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich; 
Oates, Wallace (1999) “An Essay on Fiscal Federalism”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 37, No. 3. Sep., pp. 
1120-1149; Ter-Minassian, Teresa (1997), ed., Fiscal Federalism in Theory and Practice. Washington: International 
Monetary Fund. 
6 Swenden, Wilfred (2006) Federalism and Regionalism in Western Europe. A Comparative and Thematic Analysis, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave, p. 17.  
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constitution. The comparison between these two cases will help us understand the 
similarities and differences between unitary and federal arrangements. I have chosen 
the period 2000-2010 in order to test the current stage of decentralization in the new 
millennium and because there is a significant gap in the current literature regarding 
the last decade. 
Considering the legal framework, or the institutional setting, federal countries 
should be more decentralized than unitary ones. However, as Rodden has noted, 
empirical studies take issue with this statement7. While on the one hand, Argentina 
has a federal institutional framework that expressly recognizes provincial and 
municipal autonomy, giving them at the same time a great deal of political authority 
especially in the decision-making process, the Danish constitution only recognizes the 
existence of municipalities without any specification about their autonomy or their 
role in delivering public policies. On the other hand, empirical testing shows much 
more decentralization in fiscal terms in Denmark than in Argentina. In comparing these 
two countries I will test my hypothesis which holds that the degree of fiscal autonomy 
is closely linked to the level of resources and expenditures available to subnational 
units of government. This does not necessarily correspond with the (unitary or federal) 
institutional framework, as defined in the constitutional text; nonetheless, 
institutional framework may appear as facilitator of decentralization. In other words, 
in some cases, formal institutions may matter less than formal institutions. This is why 
it is important to highlight the difference between formal institutional settings and 
actual practices in Intergovernmental Relations (IGR). The paper intends to explore 
some causal explanations in studying the role of subnational units in the process of 
decentralization.   
The structure of the article is as follow: in the first part, I will discuss some concepts 
surrounding the idea of decentralization and the different aspect it encompasses; in 
the second part, I will measure and compare institutional and fiscal decentralization 
in both countries through six indicators – elaborated on the basis of official data 
provided by governmental offices, as well as by OECD, World Bank and IMF; finally, 
the article ends with some conclusions and avenues for future research lines, drawn 
 
7 Rodden, Jonathan (2004) “Comparative Federalism and Decentralization. On meaning and Measurement” 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 36 No. 4, pp. 481-500. 
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from the case studies, considering the subnational levels’ role in decentralization 
processes. 
 
2. Part I: Decentralization. Concepts and Measurement 
 
Much has been written about decentralization. However, scholars agree in only one 
thing: the conceptual fuzziness surrounding this term8. Moreover, decentralization 
and federalism “are often assumed to be complementary or even interchangeable”9. 
Decentralization is a comprehensive concept, encompassing different aspects: 
administrative, political, fiscal, spatial, etc. Much of the literature has focused on 
fiscal decentralization, and most of it has considered only two variables: revenues and 
expenditures. Among many other effects, the processes of decentralization have 
restructured the governments’ configuration. On the one hand, making 
intergovernmental relations much more complex than before and, on the other hand, 
making sub-national governments more important partner in patterns of governance 
as a whole10.  
Following Falleti, fiscal decentralization can be defined as “the set of policies 
designed to increase the revenues or fiscal autonomy of subnational governments”11. 
It can assume different institutional forms such as the increase of central transfers, 
the capacity to create taxes, or the delegation of tax authority; it also includes the 
borrowing capacity12 and the expenditure responsibilities. Garman et al. state that 
“Capturing the extent and nature of fiscal decentralization requires considering the 
allocation and control over taxing, spending, and revenues across jurisdictions”13. In 
 
8 See Dickovick, Tyler (2003) “Centralism and ‘Decentralization’ in Unitary States: A Comparative Analysis of 
Peru and Senegal” Journal of Public and International Affairs, Vol. 14, spring, pp. 40-63; Rodden [supra, n. 6]; 
Schneider, Aaron (2003) “Decentralization: Conceptualization and Measurement”, Studies in Comparative 
International Development, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 33-56; Ter-Minassian, Teresa, Fiscal Federalism in Theory and 
Practice [supra, n. 4]. 
9 Rodden “Comparative Federalism and Decentralization…” [supra, n. 6].  
10 OECD (1997) “Managing across Levels of Government Part One: Overview”, available on: 
http://www.oecd.org/governance/budgeting/1902308.pdf. 
11 Falleti, [supra, n. 3], p. 329.  
12 See Watts, Ronald (1996) Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s, Kingston, Ontario: Queen’s University, 
Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, p. 68.  
13 Garman, Christopher, Stephan Haggard, Eliza Willis (2001) “Fiscal Decentralization: A Political Theory with 
Latin American Cases”, World Politics, Vol. 53, No. 2, Jan., pp. 205-236, p. 215.  
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turn, Bertolini et al. defined intergovernmental fiscal frameworks as “the allocation 
of responsibilities and resources across government levels”14.   
There are two major forms of decentralization process: a top-down and a bottom-
up process of decentralization. When decentralization is decided at the centre, 
decentralization would be the result of top-down planning. A bottom-up 
decentralization results when subnational units pressure the centre to migrate 
authority or/and resources to them. The first one is more likely to happen within a 
federal setting, where subnational units already enjoy some (considerable) degree of 
autonomy, especially political autonomy, which is at the same time, guaranteed by 
the constitution. Political decentralization could be defined as a set of “reforms 
designed to devolve political authority or electoral capacities to subnational actors”, 
opening “new-or activate existing but dormant or ineffective-spaces for the 
representation of subnational polities”15. However, this concept is narrow and only 
specifies the pre-requisites of political autonomy. What is important about this 
concept is the capability of subnational units to decide which policies to implement 
and how. It would make little sense if subnational units were capable to popularly 
elect their representatives if at the same time these representatives did not have 
decision-making power over any policy field.  
The second form of decentralization would be expected to occur in unitary 
countries, where the central government decides what, how, when and to which 
extent to decentralize, and the result is probably the configuration of subnational 
units according to the central preferences and needs. Negotiations may occur – as the 
Danish case has proved – but they will be restricted to questions regarding, for 
instance, the way in which decentralization will occur. This presumption does not 
mean that top-down decentralization may not occur in federal countries, or the other 
way around, bottom-up process in unitary states.   
From an administrative perspective, the most widely accepted analytical 
framework is provided by the “dominant Type-Function Framework”, elaborated by 
 
14 Bertolini, David, Sibylle Stossberg and Hansjörg Blöchliger (2016): “Fiscal decentralization and regional 
disparities”, OECD Economic Department, Working Paper No 1330, p. 7.  
15 Falleti, [supra, n. 3].  
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Cheema, Nellis, and Rondinelli16. Their approach “is based on the analytical 
classification of decentralization by form and type. Briefly, forms of decentralization 
are classified on the basis of objectives: political, spatial, market, and administrative. 
Each form is then divided into types”. Political decentralization is “the transfer of 
decision-making power to lower-level governmental units or to citizens or their 
elected representatives”17. Spatial decentralization seeks to promote regional growth 
poles in different areas of the country. The market form of decentralization occurs 
when the production and provision of some goods and services are left to civil social 
organizations (firms, cooperatives, associations, etc.). Finally, the administrative 
form of decentralization refers to the “hierarchical and functional distribution of 
powers and functions between central and non-central governmental units”18. In turn, 
administrative decentralization is subdivided in three types: deconcentration, 
devolution and delegation.  
In this work I will focus on two forms of decentralization: political and 
administrative. Within the administrative form of decentralization, I will focus only 
on the “devolution” type – understood as the transfer of authority from the “central 
governments to local-level governmental units holding corporate status granted under 
state legislation.”19 Since my work does not take into account other types of 
organizations and/or institutions (for instance, civil society), I will focus only on these 
two forms (and one type of the second form of administrative decentralization) 
because these are the only concepts involving levels of governments20.  
At first glance, devolution (as a type of administrative decentralization) and 
political decentralization seem to be equal. However, after a more in-depth 
 
16 Cohen, John M. and Stephen B. Peterson (1997) “Administrative Decentralization: A New Framework for 
Improved Governance, Accountability, and Performance”, Development Discussion Paper 582, Harvard Institute for 
International Development, p. 30.  
17 Id. p. 29.  
18 Id. p. 29.   
19 Id.  
20 “Deconcentration”, for instance, involves, according to Cohen and Peterson “different levels under the 
jurisdictional authority of the central government” [supra, n. 3, p. 20], so the decision-making, financial, and 
management functions are still being concentrated in only one level of government (for instance, the central 
government). In turn, “delegation” is understood, following the same authors, as “the transfer of government 
decision-making and administrative authority and/or responsibility for carefully spelled out tasks to institutions and 
organizations that are either under its indirect control or independent” (p. 30). This occurs when the central 
government delegates some specific tasks to semiautonomous organizations, for instance, state owned enterprises.  
12 
 
consideration, we can state that there is a crucial distinction: devolution, like 
political decentralization, implies the transfer of authority (decision-making) by 
central governments to subnational levels. However, unlike political decentralization, 
the decentralization of authority is granted under state legislation. Therefore, 
devolution may occur in both federal and unitary countries, while political 
decentralization may occur only in federal countries through the national constitution. 
However, unitary countries – without modifying their centralist constitution – may 
operate a decentralization located at some point between the two concepts. In short, 
the difference between administrative devolution and political decentralization lies 
mainly in the type of legislation through which decentralization is done: constitutional 
or ordinary legislation (be it central or subnational).  
If decentralization occurs by means of a constitutional disposition, it should be 
understood as an inherent power recognized by the subnational level and that the 
centre cannot (unilaterally) revoke local authorities. These different degrees of 
decentralization set subnational units in different positions regarding the central 
level: “Regions of a regionalized state stand in a weaker position relative to the centre 
than regions in a federal state. However, they are in a stronger position than the 
subnational entities in a unitary decentralized state. Like regionalized states, the 
subnational entities owe their strength to the centre. Most likely these subnational 
entities also have directly elected councils and executive bodies”21.  
Other literature focuses on decentralization from an intergovernmental relation 
approach22. Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) are a very important dimension of 
decentralization. Focusing on decentralization from the IGR perspectives implies to 
bring into the analysis the different types of governments and the distribution of 
responsibilities between them: “there is great conceptual difference between 
«federal states» and «unitary states». Their political traditions and the «theoretical» 
capacity of subnational governments differ greatly in both cases, although some 
similarities between the two can then appear when reviewing the operation of certain 
 
21 Swenden [supra, n. 5]. 
22 Among others, Jordana, Jacint (2002) Relaciones Intergubernamentales y Descentralización en América Latina. 
Casos de Argentina y Bolivia, INDES –European Community Working Paper, June, Washington: Inter-American 
Development Bank; Wright, Deil (1988) Understanding intergovernmental relations, Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks-
Cole. 
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public policies”23. When there are three levels of governments (central, intermediate 
and local), which is most common in federal states, IGR are more complex than when 
there are only two levels (central and local), which is typical in unitary countries. 
Indeed, with three levels three different axes of relations (local-intermediate, 
intermediate-central and local-central) may occur, whereas with two levels, there is 
only one axis of relations24. 
Focusing on an IGR approach of decentralization, the issue of division of 
responsibilities gains importance in the analysis. Cohen and Peterson propose a model 
based on how specific task-related roles are shared by levels of governments, and 
identify two institutional formulas: Distributed Institutional Monopoly and Institutional 
Pluralism25. In a Distributed Institutional Monopoly formula there is an explicit 
division of responsibilities between levels of government within each one of the public 
policies, with segments decentralized to subnational units and others that remain 
centralized at the central unit26. Jordana, following Cohen and Peterson’s 1997 work, 
identifies these two formulas of decentralization with two specific models of IGR, in 
an analytical coincidence between decentralization, public policies and IGR. The 
Distributed Institutional Monopoly formula corresponds with an IGR model of 
separation of powers, and consequently, relations between levels of governments are 
rare. This is due to the existence of “big areas of responsibility separated according 
to the nature of public policies.”27 All components of the same policy (decision-
making, implementation, evaluation, etc.) are located at one level of government. 
This model fits with the so-called dual federalism, “a model of allocating exclusive 
legislative and administrative power in a policy field”28, followed by most Anglo-
American federations, in which each level of government acts autonomously and 
independently. The Institutional Pluralism formula matches the IGR intertwine 
model, in which relations occur more often between levels, due to the existence of 
 
23 Jordana [supra, n. 21] p. 11.  
24 Id. 
25 Cohen and Peterson (1997) “Administrative Decentralization…” [supra, n. 3] p. 20.  
26 Jordana [supra, n. 21]. 
27 Id., p. 13. 
28 Thorlakson, Lori (2003) “Comparing Federal Institutions: Power and Representation in Six Federations”, West 
European Politics, Vol. 26, N° 2, p. 7.  
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several concurrent competences and the need for coordination29. Within this formula 
exists an explicit division of responsibilities between levels of government within each 
one of the public policies; some elements of the given policy are decentralized to 
subnational units, whereas others remain centralized at the central level30. This 
formula fits with a cooperative federalism model, most typical in European and Latin-
American federations31.  
Finally, the leading scholar in IGR, Deil Wright, presented three models of IGR: The 
coordinate authority model, in which competences between the state and subnational 
units are clearly separated and the distinct boundaries separating the levels of 
government. The second is the inclusive authority model, in which IGRs are 
characterized by the predominant role of the national level, in a hierarchical 
relationship. The third is the overlapping authority model, in which 
intergovernmental relationships are structured in a set of overlapping competences 
among national, state, and local units simultaneously. Bargaining and negotiations are 
the most characteristic feature of this third model32.  
 
Box 1. Different approaches of Decentralization  
Institutional 
formulas of 
Public Policies  
(COHEN and 
PETERSON 1997) 
IGR Models 
(JORDANA 2002) 
IGR Models  
(WRIGHT 1988) 
Federal 
traditions 
(THORLAKSON 
2003) 
Constitutional  
perspective 
MLG 
(HOOGHE 
and MARKS 
2003) 
Distributed 
Institutional 
Monopoly  
Separation of 
powers 
Coordinate 
authority 
model 
Dual 
federalism  
Exclusive  
competences  
Type I 
Institutional 
Pluralism 
Interweaving 
model  
Overlapping 
authority 
model 
Cooperative 
federalism  
Concurrent /  
shared 
competences  
Type II 
  Inclusive 
authority 
model 
   
Source: Own elaboration based on Cohen and Peterson [supra, n. 3]; Jordana [supra, n. 21], Wright [supra, 
n. 21], Thorlakson [supra, n. 27], and Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks (2003) “Unraveling the Central State, 
but How? Types of Multi-level Governance”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 2, pp. 233-243. 
 
 
29 Jordana [supra, n. 21], p. 13. 
30 Id. 
31 Thorlakson “Comparing Federal Institutions…” [supra, n.27].  
32 Wright, Deil (1988) Understanding intergovernmental relations [supra, n. 21]; see also Agranoff, Robert and 
Beryl Radiny (2014) “Deil Wright’s Overlapping Model of Intergovernmental Relations: The Basis for 
Contemporary Intergovernmental Relationships”, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, pp. 1-21. 
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All these conceptualizations and classifications are, to some extent, related and 
linked to those proposed by legal approaches, in particular constitutional and 
administrative perspectives33. Both perspectives emphasize a distinctive element: the 
ability to decide – or not – upon certain competencies or policies, and they 
differentiate two concepts: autonomy and autarky, depending on the type and range 
of authority which is decentralized. Autonomy implies political decentralization and 
what is displaced is the political power; it comprises a dismemberment of the political 
power, thus, the distribution comprehends the higher powers of authority that 
characterize the modern state. This kind of decentralization can only be done through 
a formal Constitution. Autarky, in turn, is a widely used term in administrative law 
and it implies a displacement of some administrative functions necessary to activate 
some functions of the political power. However, this decentralization does not imply 
the transfer of functions that are typical of the modern state (public security, justice 
administration, law-making, etc.), tasks that characterize it and, consequently, 
cannot be displaced to other units – otherwise it would imply recognizing these other 
units as new levels of government.  
Finally, these conceptualizations are in line with the notion of autonomy proposed 
by specialized literature on local government. Autonomy is defined, according to 
Pratchett, as the exercise of (some) degree of discretion, translated into “freedom 
from” and “freedom to”; the first one is a constitutional and legal perspective, it 
means “the degree of discretion that local authorities have from central 
government”34 and the second kind of freedom is the real impact of that (theoretical, 
formal and legal) autonomy, the consequences of such freedoms35. Clark identifies, 
“using the language of contemporary legal theory”, two primary principles of local 
autonomy: the power of initiation “which refers to the actions of local governments 
 
33 See, among the constitutionalists, Hernández, Antonio M. (2003) Derecho Municipal. Parte general, México: 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México; Bidart Campos, Germán (2006) Manual de la Constitución Reformada, 
Vol. 1, Buenos Aires: Ediar; Sagüés, Néstor P. (2003) Elementos de Derecho Constitucional, Vol. I, Buenos Aires: 
Astrea; and among administrative scholars, Marienhoff, Miguel S. (1965) Tratado de Derecho Administrativo, 
Buenos Aires: Abeledo-Perrot; Dromi, José R. (1998) Derecho Administrativo, Buenos Aires: Ciudad Argentina; 
Gordillo, Agustín (2009) Tratado de Derecho Administrativo: Parte general, Buenos Aires: F.D.A.  
34 Pratchett, Lawrence (2004) “Local Autonomy. Local Democracy and the New Localism” Political Studies, Vol. 
52, pp. 358-375, p. 363. 
35 Id. P. 365.  
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in carrying out their rightful duties”36 and  the power of immunity, understood as “the 
power of localities to act without fear of the oversight authority of higher tiers of the 
state; [the possibility of] local governments to act however they wish within the limits 
imposed by their initiative powers”37. 
As can be appreciated, there is room for an interdisciplinary dialogue among 
political science’s neo-institutionalist and IRG approaches, on the one hand, and legal 
perspectives, especially from public law and constitutional law, on the other hand. 
Indeed, Pratchett and Clark’s conceptions of autonomy come from political science, 
however, both, as they recognize, rely upon legal perspectives. 
Decentralization implies the devolution of authority and enhanced flexibility and 
changed relationships with other levels of government. These processes, however, 
have brought with them tensions between levels of government: “Fiscal issues are, 
therefore, at the heart of many of these tensions, and in many countries fiscal and 
financial pressures have been the major factor in seeking more decentralized modes 
of governance”38. Fiscal decentralization could be defined as the “set of policies 
designed to increase the revenues or fiscal autonomy of subnational governments”, 
be it by means of transfers from the central government, the creation of new 
subnational taxes or by the delegation of tax authority that was previously national39. 
However, in order to pursue a proper theoretical approach, it is necessary to consider 
public expenditure and, consequently, determine the competences subnational 
governments are empowered to pursue. On the one hand, it is necessary to consider 
the level of expenditure that these competencies demand with respect to their own 
resources (own resources and central resources). On the other hand, it requires 
determining whether such competences are simply administrated by subnational 
entities (administrative decentralization) or whether subnational governments have 
some power to decide upon those policies (political decentralization). 
 
 
36 Clark, Gordon (1984) “A Theory of Local Autonomy” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 74 
(2), pp. 195-208, p. 198.   
37 Id.   
38  OECD [supra, n. 9] p. 15.  
39 Falleti [supra, n. 3] p. 329.  
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2.1 Measuring decentralization 
 
The methodology employed in this work is analytical and empirical regarding fiscal 
decentralization in each one of the selected case studies. On the one hand, this 
project conducts a comparative analysis between Latin American and European 
countries, and on the other hand, between decentralized unitary and federal 
countries, comparing, therefore, fiscal decentralization in different institutional 
settings. The study of decentralization implies to address the concept of autonomy of 
subnational governments. In this respect, autonomy is a construct that can be 
measured through some indicators. These indicators are useful to measure the degree 
of decentralization vis-a-vis the fiscal autonomy of subnational governments. On the 
basis of data supplied by countries’ official sources and international organizations 
(FMI, World Bank, OECD), I have elaborated a series of indicators – expressed in 
quantitative terms (percentages) – applied to characterize fiscal decentralization, to 
indicate its most particular specific characteristics and to highlight similarities and 
differences between the cases under study.  
These indicators could be classified in two main groups (according to the source of 
information): a first group is made using the constitutional and legal texts (indicators 
1 and 2) in order to study the formal structure of each country. The second group of 
indicators is elaborated on the basis of official data regarding financial and fiscal 
information (indicators 3 to 6). These six indicators are:  
(1) Constitutional allocation of competences and powers that measures the size 
of subnational government within the country. What we need to consider 
here is which competences correspond to each level of government 
according to the constitution (federal states) or legal dispositions (unitary 
states). 
(2)  Constitutional allocation of revenue-raising capacity between levels of 
government measures the formal or institutional decentralization of 
autonomy’s fiscal aspect and the scope of provincial power taxation. The 
information needed is about which kind of taxes constitutionally or legally 
correspond to each level of government.  
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(3) Revenues directly raised by each level of government, excluding central 
transfers, measures the degree of fiscal autonomy of subnational 
governments, considering, therefore, the effective exercise of such powers. 
The degree of fiscal autonomy translates into the independence of 
subnational government about what to expend and to what extent. This 
indicator measures the effective exercise of fiscal power, given that 
constitutionally or even legally provisions not always are consistent with 
reality (for instance, in the Argentine case the constitutional distribution of 
taxation  power was left aside through intergovernmental agreements 
between national and subnational levels of government).  
(4) Transfer Mechanisms of central funds to subnational units and others form 
to finance subnational expenditure. Considering subnational own-resources 
plus central transfers we can have an index to measure the total amount of 
resources at the disposal of subnational governments. The existence of 
central or federal transfers implies the insufficiency of local resources to 
afford their responsibilities – and consequently a lesser autonomy in what 
and how much to expend. It is necessary therefore to consider the size and 
character of these transfers (conditional or unconditional, discretionary or 
non-discretionary) in order to measure the extent of dependency in 
administration of their competences and delivery of public services.  
(5) Total expenditure of each level of government combined is another useful 
index to measure the size of subnational administration of competences and 
public services. It is also complementary to the former index 
(central/federal transfers) to measure the degree of dependency or 
autonomy with which levels of government perform their responsibilities40. 
In this respect, it is necessary to distinguish to what extent subnational units 
cover their expenses with own resources and which percentage with federal 
transfers.  
 
40 Watts, Ronald (1996) Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s, [supra, n. 11] p. 68.  
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(6) Finally, variables (3), (4) and (5) lead us to another index, the sixth variable 
(6) fiscal imbalance that measures the gap between the federal transfers 
and the total subnational spending.  
These six aspects of fiscal decentralization are used as quantitative variables to 
measure the degree of subnational autonomy (expressed as percentage). The two first 
variables are legal and measure the degree of institutional decentralization. Aware 
of the fact that constitutional prescriptions may not apply in practice, these two 
variables have to be taken carefully41. The remaining variables measure different 
aspects of decentralization and are elaborated with official data provided by countries 
and international organizations’ official databases (such as OECD, World Bank and 
IMF).  
In order to conceptualize these institutional structures, I rely on a 
legal/constitutional perspective, i.e., according to how territorial organization is 
defined in each country in their constitutional texts, as well as through legislative 
reforms (infra-constitutional) producing changes in the territorial organization. 
According to this classification, federalism does not necessarily mean more 
decentralization. Constitutionally unitary countries may have a degree of 
decentralization equal or even greater than federal countries. With this caveat in 
mind, the term “multilevel government” proposed by Hooghe and Marks42 is useful to 
refer to decentralized countries, encompassing federal as well as unitary countries. 
The authors have defined the term Multi-Level Government (MLG) as the dispersion 
of authoritative decision-making across multiple territorial levels. The broadness of 
the concept encompasses the idea of continuum describe above, and federal and 
 
41 Whether or not the constitution establishes that a competence is concurrent, this does not imply necessarily that 
in practice both levels of government implement and administrate this competence in an independent fashion. 
Intergovernmental coordination between levels of government (including municipalities) may distribute the different 
aspects of a single public policy between levels. For instance, as occur in most federations, when a competence is 
allocated by the constitution to both levels, federal governments generally reserve to themselves the formulation (or 
at least the minimum national standards) of a policy, whereas subnational levels (states and municipalities, or both) 
remain in charge of its implementation. The same may occur with the constitutional allocation of fiscal and taxation 
powers. On the other hand, federal government may centralize (encroaching upon the jurisdictions of the states) or 
decentralize (shifting burdens away from the centre) some competences in a way that in practice, only federal 
government or only the states manage the competence – despite the constitutional definition of the competence as a 
concurrent one.   
42 Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks (2001) Multi-Level Governance and European Integration, Lanham: Rowman 
& Littlefield; Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks (2003) “Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-
level Governance”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 2, pp. 233-243. 
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unitary countries could be located in one point of the line according not to the formal 
institutional framework, but according to how task and functions are distributed and 
redistributed between levels of government.  
Finally, and given the diverse terminology used by different countries to designate 
units of government, it is necessary to clarify and unify concepts to avoid confusion. 
In this paper, the term “intermediate level” will be used to refer to provincial 
(Argentina) and regional (Denmark) levels of governments, and the expression 'local' 
when referring to municipalities. The term “subnational unit” will be used to refer to 
both the intermediate and the local levels.  
 
3. Part II: Measuring and Comparing Decentralization in Argentina and 
Denmark  
 
In the following section I will compare the degree of institutional and fiscal 
decentralization in Argentina and Denmark throug six variables/indicators described 
above and summarized in Table 1.   
  
Table 1. Degree of Decentralization in Argentina and Denmark.  
All percentages in average between 2000 and 2010.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Policy 
implem. 
Tax. 
power 
Own  
Rev. 
Federal transfers (3) + 
(4) 
Subnat. 
Spendin
g  
VFI 
Gener
al 
Soci
al 
No %  Tot
al  
Non-
Earm 
Earm
.  
Argentina  58% 86% 4 11% 18 60 48% 11% 48 49 0,37 
Denmark  42% 86% 6 20% 30 41 18% 32% 59 62 0,48 
           
Considering both subnational levels: Argentina (provinces and municipalities) Denmark (Regions and 
municipalities). 
(1) Percentage of Policy Implementation over a 19 policy areas.  
(2) Subnational tax autonomy. Argentine municipalities actually do not levy any tax (despite the 
national and provincials constitutions recognize them tax autonomy). Regions in Denmark are no 
longer allowed to levy taxes since the 2007 reform. Still, the percentage of subnational levels 
remains the same.  
(3) Subnational Tax resources, without central grants or transfers.  
(4) A. Total Transfers as percentage of total subnational resources; B-C. Non-earmarked and 
earmarked central transfers as percentage of total subnational resources, both as percentage of total 
subnational resources.  
(3) + (4) Overall amount of available subnational resources (own-resources plus central -non-
earmarked and earmarked – transfers) as percentage total country resources.   
(5) Total subnational expenditure as percentage of total country (general government) expenditure.  
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3.1 Variable One: Competence Assignment  
The territorial organization of both countries recognizes three levels of 
government: central, intermediate and local. The last two are subnational levels. 
Intermediate levels in Denmark are the regions (regioners) or counties before the 2007 
reform, and provinces (provincias) in Argentina. In both countries local tiers are called 
municipalities (kommuner in Denmark and municipios in Argentina). In both countries, 
the two subnational tiers have directly elected representatives. However, in Denmark 
they do not have institutional participation at the central decision-making arena, that 
is, in the national parliament, while Argentine provinces have representation both in 
the senate and the chamber of deputies (since the last one is divided in districts 
coinciding with the provincial boundaries).   
In unitary countries, intermediate and local levels are regulated by ordinary laws. 
This would suggest that decision-making remains at the central level only. In Denmark, 
article 82 of its Constitution – entitled “local autonomy” – prescribes “The right of the 
municipalities to manage their own affairs independently under the supervision of the 
State shall be laid down by Statute.” This constitutional disposition has been 
unchanged since the Constitution of 1849. According to our theoretical framework, 
this constitutional disposition is a clear example of devolution type of administrative 
decentralization, since the central state transfers authority to subnational 
governmental levels by means of state legislation, which means that the political 
power to decide whether or not to transfer (o even to implement the service) remains, 
ultimately, at the central level of government. As a unitary country, subnational levels 
do not have autonomy guaranteed by the constitution.   
However, Denmark has a long tradition of subnational self-government since the 
nineteenth century or even before43. After the 1970 reform, and “following the 
amalgamations, a reform of local government functions was carried through over the 
next ten or twenty years. New tasks were transferred to local governments from the 
central government, and increased autonomy was introduced in the welfare areas that 
 
43  Blom-Hansen, Jens and Anne Heeager (2011) “Denmark: Between Local Democracy and Implementing Agency 
of the Welfare State”, in Loughlin, John, Frank Hendriks and Anders Lidström, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Local 
and Regional Democracy in Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 222-240, p. 223.  
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municipalities and counties already administrated”44. In 2007 a structural municipal 
reform took place, replacing the previous legislation from 1970. Therefore, there are 
two differentiated periods in the Danish case: 1970-2007 and 2007-2010. The reform 
of 1970 (in force until 2007) allocated more competences to subnational levels 
(municipalities and counties). In the 2007 reform “the old counties were stripped of 
almost all functions, which were divided between the central government and the 
new large municipalities”45. Both reforms were legislatives, i.e., decided and 
implemented by means of central ordinary laws. The 2007 reform, for instance, was 
made through 50 major laws. The 2007 reform has three specific purposes: firstly, to 
reduce the number of regions and municipalities (passing from 271 to 98 municipalities 
and from 14 counties to 5 regions), secondly, to redistribute functions and tasks, and 
finally, the implementation of a new financing system. Regarding the territorial 
government structure, the reform implied an amalgamation of municipalities and 
regions. Concerning the functions and tasks, it allocated more functions to 
municipalities and to the central government, reducing simultaneously the functions 
of the (new) regions. Consequently, the expenditure share of the new regions 
decreased, and central and local shares increased.   
 
Distribution of tasks and competences between levels of governments 
In the distribution of competences in both countries, central governments reserve for 
themselves the traditional functions related to defence, foreign affairs, army, 
economy (control of the money supply and of the financial system), etc., whereas 
subnational units are in charge of implementation of social policy areas.  
 
Table 1.1. Implementation of public policies 
Competence Argentina Denmark  
1970 2007 
1.  International relations46  F C C 
2.  Army / Armed forces F C C 
3.  Citizenship  F C C 
4.  issue currency, monetary and measures 
systems 
F C C 
5.  Telecommunications services F C C 
 
44 Id., p. 222.  
45 Id., p. 224.  
46 Including declaration war, making peace, ensure national defence, etc.  
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6.  Air and aerospace navigation F C C 
7.  Work / labor policies Concurrent M M 
8.  Health  P R  R/M  
9.  Culture, education and science Concurrent M  M  
10.  Primary education  P M M  
11.  Secondary and high education   P R C 
12.  Universities  F C C 
13.  Environment Concurrent C/R Concurrent 
14.  Housing  Concurrent M M 
15.  Formation of new subnational units  Concurrent C C 
16.  Immigration  Concurrent  M 
17.  Foreign and interstate trade and 
communication  
F C C 
18.  Road  Concurrent R  M  
19.  Police and security services  Concurrent C C 
 
Distribution of competences is shown in Table 1.1. Although this information 
involves a fair amount of discretion, it is still useful to highlight the degree of 
decentralization in policy implementation. In Argentina, eight competences are 
exclusively federal (42 per cent), three exclusive provincial (16 per cent), five are 
concurrent (26 per cent) and three are shared (16 per cent). In Denmark, eleven 
competences are exclusively central (58 per cent), seven are exclusive subnational 
competences (37 per cent) and one is concurrent between central and subnational (5 
per cent).  
Among those general competences, eight were classified as social policies (printed 
in dark): in Argentina, three are concurrent (38 per cent), one is shared (13 percent), 
three are exclusively provincial (38 per cent) and one is federal (13 per cent). In 
conclusion, over social policies, provinces are in charge of most of them (88 per cent 
of social policies fall into provincial jurisdiction). In Denmark, subnational units are in 
charge to implement six of seven. Between them, health is a divided policy between 
municipalities and regions (being the regions in charge only of hospitalization 
services). Danish Subnational levels are in charge of implementing 85 per cent of social 
policies, and only 15 per cent the central government (secondary and university 
education –recentralized in the 2007 reform, passing from the former counties to the 
central government). Considering both exclusive subnational and concurrent 
competences, subnational units in Argentina are in charge of 58 per cent of general 
public policies, and 42 per cent in Denmark. Regarding social policies, both countries 
show the same percentage: 86 per cent.  
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Table 1.2. Degree of Decentralization in Policy 
Implementation  
 
Exclusive  
Fed/Central 
Exclusive 
Subnational 
Concu-
rrent  
 No % No % No %  
Denmark 11 58% 7 37% 1 5% 19 
Argentina  8 42% 3 16% 8 42% 19 
        
 
Subnational units in Argentina are constitutionally endowed with a wealth of 
authority, making it a highly decentralized federation at the political and/or 
institutional aspect. The national constitution reserves residual power upon the 
subnational units (art. 121, CAN). When the residual clause is in favour of subnational 
units, the constitution endows to the central government with enumerated and limited 
competences. The Argentine federation has this principle of distribution of power: 
“The provinces reserve to themselves all the powers not delegated to the Federal 
Government by this Constitution, as well as those powers expressly reserved to 
themselves by special pacts at the time of their incorporation” (Art. 121). 
Consequently, federal government’s competencies are enumerated (expressly or 
implicitly) in the constitutional text.  
However, as Thorlakson warns, “constitutional allocation may mask the underlying 
reality of power allocation in the state”47.  Argentina is an integrative federalism48, 
in the sense that the provinces– through a constitution – created a central government 
and delegated to it a set of competencies and authorities (similar to the cases of USA, 
Switzerland and Germany). This federal design is similar to the German, Australian 
and Swiss federations, in where “concurrent powers are used extensively”49. Those 
federations have as common feature that they have relatively few policy fields falling 
under exclusive state competence. In this respect, all these countries are 
institutionally more decentralized to others developed federations such as United 
States or Austria, where constitutions provide fewer concurrent competencies50.   
 
47 Thorlakson [supra, n. 27], p. 11.  
48 See, Hernández, Antonio M. (2011) Sub-National Constitutional Law in Argentina, BV, Netherlands: Kluwer 
Law International.   
49 Thorlakson [supra, n. 27], p. 9.  
50 Id.; also Watts, Ronald (1999) The Spending Power in Federal Systems: A Comparative Study, Kingston, Ontario: 
Queen’s University, Institute of Intergovernmental Relations. 
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3.2 Variable Two: Tax Power Allocation  
This second variable is an institutional variable too. The allocation of revenue-
raising capacity between levels of government measures the formal or institutional 
decentralization of autonomy’s fiscal aspect and the scope of subnational power 
taxation. What we need to consider here is which kind of taxes constitutionally or 
legally correspond to each level of government. Taxation power represents the 
genuine resources subnational governments could enjoy, and the consequent freedom 
to expend them. The formal or institutional decentralization of an autonomy’s fiscal 
aspect refers to tax autonomy, understood as “the various aspects of the freedom sub-
central governments have over their own taxes”51.  
Following OECD’s classification and taxonomy of tax autonomy, taxes are classified 
in terms of the kind of autonomy they provide to state and local governments52. From 
this institutional aspect, is possible to see that regardless the percentage of 
subnational levels over the total tax revenue in a country, subnational governments 
(depending on the particular fiscal arrangements in place) may have or have not 
limited influence over taxes which are assigned to their jurisdiction. We can observe 
that unitary countries are very different from federal countries in this respect. In 
principle, federal countries set the tax autonomy in their own constitutions, whereas 
unitary countries regulate it through national laws. As we can observe in the Danish 
case, subnational governments do not enjoy full autonomy over their “own” taxes, 
which are provided by national legislations. In Argentina, on the contrary, subnational 
governments (both, provinces and municipalities) do enjoy full autonomy, being able 
to set different kinds of taxes. However, institutional autonomy differs from the actual 
autonomy over power taxation.  
In principle, in Denmark taxing power remains at the central government, since the 
constitution does not provide any tax power to a different level of government. All 
taxes (central and local) are legislated by national laws and collected by central 
government. As in the rest of Scandinavian countries, “financing is centralized and 
 
51 OECD (1999), “Taxing powers of state and local government”, OECD Tax Policy Studies No. 1. 
52 Id., p. 9-10.  
26 
 
dominated by regulated income tax revenue sharing and central government grants”53. 
The 2007 reform further centralizes this competence: among the functions that were 
highly centralized, it was included tax administration, “which was a shared 
responsibility before the reform and now is a fully centralised function under the 
Ministry of Taxation”54. However, in the evolution of the Danish system of tax 
financing, central government allowed municipalities and counties to set freely the 
rate of income taxes (corporate income taxes and several personal income taxes).  
Following the OECD 2009 taxonomy of tax autonomy, municipalities in Denmark have 
some degree of autonomy regarding two groups of taxes: Taxes group A which 
encompasses tax on certain public corporations and the municipal land tax (market 
value), in which the tax base is set in national legislation, but tax rate is set by the 
municipalities. Taxes group B encompasses four types of personal income tax and most 
of the corporate taxes. These are shared between central government and 
municipalities. In these taxes, tax base and tax rates are set in legislation, and the 
central government is legally free to change both the tax base and the rate, although 
that never happens in practice without previous negotiations and an explicit consent 
of local governments.   
Before 2007, Counties had some degree of tax autonomy, yet minimal. Counties 
were able to set the rate tax of personal income tax, but this power was limited 
according to the level of outlays (falling into category B in the OECD 1999 taxonomy). 
Counties also share a percentage of two other taxes: the property taxes (market value) 
and the counties’ property tax, but “the tax base of the property taxes (market value) 
and the tax rate for the counties’ property tax are defined in legislation” (1 percent 
of property tax). County land tax fits Category E of the OECD classification, the lesser 
degree of tax autonomy – just before Category F, which means no-tax autonomy55. 
Currently, and after the 2007 reform, the new regions (the former “counties”) do not 
 
53 Rattsø, Jørn (2005) “Local tax financing in the Nordic countries”, Economic General Report for the 2004 Nordic 
Tax Research Council meeting in Oslo, forthcoming in Yearbook for Nordic Tax Research.  
54 LGDK (Local Government Denmark) (2009) “The Danish Local Government System” p. 22. From 1 November 
2005 until 2007, “the formerly divided Danish tax administration became a unity administration joint in the Ministry 
of Taxation”. The tax administration consisted of a state tax administration with regional offices and a municipal 
tax administration (OECD, n.d., “Tax Policy Reform in Denmark”, available on: https://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-
policy/37154664.pdf., p. 12).  
55 OECD (1999), “Taxing powers of state and local government…” [supra, n. 50] p. 32.   
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have any power taxation, falling into category F of OECD 1999 taxonomy, being 
financed by central government grants according to the level of expenditure regarding 
some few functions they presently are in charged after the reform. The difference 
between both periods are considerable. looking at the level of expenditure and own 
resources (analysed in the next chapters). Considering each tax individually, in many 
of the direct taxes municipalities have some degree of autonomy: property tax, tax 
on the value of land (land tax) and corporate taxes. The central state levies direct 
taxes as health contributions, labour market contributions and property value tax, and 
almost all indirect taxes, such as value added tax (VAT), green taxes, excise duties 
and customs duties. Municipalities also levy fees and duties, such as the duty on 
building certificates, some fees including publican’s licenses and entertainment taxes 
– e.g. on slot machines –, duty for meat and foodstuff control. Most of these fees are 
fixed in legislation or subject to some restrictions, such as an upper-bound, set in 
legislation56. However, they represent a very low percentage in local budgets. 
As in many federations, the Argentine constitution adopts a current tax system 
regarding internal taxes. According to the constitution, provinces are endowed with 
power to levy direct and indirect internal taxes. The exercise taxing power over 
indirect taxes (the Value Added Tax among the most important) is concurrent with the 
federal government (Art. 75.2), whereas the federal taxing power over direct taxes 
(income tax, property tax) is only an exceptional competence. According to Art. 75.2 
federal government is authorized to levy direct taxes for a specified term and 
proportionally equal throughout the national territory, only when the defence, 
common security and general welfare of the State so require it. In spite of this 
constitutional mandate, federal government has created and collected direct taxes in 
a permanently and continuously fashion since 1930 to present. Art. 75.1 attributes 
exclusively to the federal government the power to lay import and export duties, 
being forbidden to provinces (Art. 126). However, Argentine provinces actually levy 
only four taxes as exclusive competence. This is because specific agreements through 
intergovernmental coordination57. Just the opposite of the Danish case, where 
 
56 Id., p. 33.  
57 These intergovernmental agreements were based in different formal pacts signed by the President and Governors 
in early and in the late 1990s.   
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informal (non-institutionalized) agreements and negotiations between levels of 
governments allow subnational units to enjoy more financial power over the years, in 
Argentina formal agreements between federal government and provinces were 
utilized to restrain provincial and municipal power taxation, centralizing tax 
legislation and tax collection in the federal level. In short, the current and practical 
assignment of revenues in Argentina is as follows: federal government recollects: (a) 
income tax; (b) VAT; (c) Excise taxes; (d) import and export duties; (e) liquid fuel and 
energy taxes; (f) gross assets tax; (g) personal assets tax; (g) social security taxes (just 
to mention the most important). Provinces in turn collect the following (only) four 
taxes: (a) automobile taxes; (b) tax on immovable property; (c) stamp duty and (d) 
gross receipts tax58. Municipalities only collect charges and administrative fees, even 
though the national and provincial constitutions recognize them a broad tax power. 
This is mainly a consequence of coordination between federal and provincial 
governments on fiscal authority distribution. In general, federal government collects 
all taxes (which are subject to revenue sharing with provinces), except those four 
taxes which are currently collected by provinces and import and export duties.  
 
Measuring tax autonomy 
Measuring tax autonomy is a complex issue. In order to simplify this matter, I follow 
the OECD 1999 taxonomy of subnational tax autonomy. Argentine provinces fall into 
the Category A.1 regarding all internal taxes (direct and indirect taxes), and Category 
F regarding import and export duties, while Danish municipalities fall into Category B 
(Municipal land tax and tax on certain public corporations) and into Category D.3 
(Personal income tax and corporate taxes). As we can observe, tax autonomy in 
Denmark is limited at the institutional level. Municipalities have no freedom to 
introduce (or to abolish) any tax or to define the tax base, but only to set the tax rate 
over some kind of taxes (categories B and D). However, the real functioning of the 
financing system is quite different from institutional design in both cases.  
 
 
58 Schwartz, G. And Liuksila, C. (1997) “Argentina” in Ter-Minassian, Teresa, ed., Fiscal Federalism in Theory 
and Practice. Washington: International Monetary Fund, pp. 387-422. 
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TABLE #2.1 Tax Autonomy over Current taxes by level of 
Government  
Level Argentina  Denmark 
  Before 2007 After 2007 
 No. % No. % No. % 
Central   31 89% 20 67% 20 67% 
Intermediate 4 11% 4 13% - - 
Local  - - 6 20% 6 20% 
 35 100% 30 100% 30 100% 
 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Public Finance of Argentina 
Databases and Ministry of Finance of Brazil (2002).   
 
As shown in Table 2.1, and regardless the institutional framework, actually 
subnational levels in both countries have limited autonomy in a lower percentage 
comparing with central levels. In Denmark, even though the central government is 
legally able to unilaterally change tax legislation (tax and rate tax) and the share of 
subnational government, this did not happen without previous negotiations with 
municipalities, and they share much of the most important taxes. Considering that 
municipalities do not enjoy institutional autonomy over taxation, in practice they have 
some degree of autonomy over six individual taxes over a total of thirty current taxes 
in the country (a twenty percent). In Argentina, although the constitution recognises 
subnational tax autonomy, in practice provinces only levy four of 35 current taxes in 
the country, and municipalities do not recollect any tax – only charges and 
administrative fees59. The remaining internal taxes (direct and indirect taxes) are 
levied by the central government, but ultimately shared with provinces through a 
shared system, known as co-participation regime, in which central government 
legislates and recollects most of the taxes and subsequently shares some percentage 
with provinces. As this regimen is considered as a transfer in national and provincial 
budgets, I will analyse it in the “transfers” section below.  
Both outcomes were reached through agreements; however, while in the Danish 
case those agreements sought to increase local tax autonomy, in the Argentine case, 
provinces have preferred centralized tax administration (self-limiting their own 
taxation power). Subnational levels in Argentina enjoy autonomy over a limited 
number of taxes (eleven per cent) compared to the Danish case. 
 
59 It is true that in some provinces, municipalities are allowed to collect some taxes or they share some provincial 
taxes, but the general principle is that municipalities do not introduce any tax.  
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3.3 Variable Three: Subnational Own-Resources 
Variable three intends to capture the amounts of resources that are genuinely 
subnational. This excludes transfers or grants derived from the central government. 
In other words, this variable considers the actual exercise of fiscal power, which may 
be different as provided by the institutional setting. As we can observe in Table 3.1, 
subnational governments in Denmark almost double Argentine subnational 
governments, considering in both cases intermediate and local governments.   
 
Table 3.1. Subnational governments’' share in total country revenue (intermediate and local 
levels) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010  AVG 
Argentina 22% 21% 20% 18% 17% 17% 18% 17% 17% 19% 18%  18% 
Denmark 31% 32% 34% 34% 32% 31% 31% 24% 25% 26% 27%  30% 
              
Sources: Own elaboration base on OECD Database (for Federal and provincial levels) and 
Ministerio de Economía, Dirección Nacional de Coordinación Fiscal con las Provincias (for 
municipalities only). 
 
Over the last ten years, subnational governments’ share in Denmark shows an average of 
30 percent. The table shows a decrease since 2007, passing from 31 per cent in 2006 to 24 per 
cent in 2007, and since then it rises again. Only in 2007, local governments decreased seven 
points in their own-resources. This is due mainly to the 2007 reform, which took away 
resources from regions and redistributed them between central and local governments. 
Argentine subnational governments instead show a continue declining line, ranging from 22 
per cent in 2000 to 18 per cent in 2010, losing 4 per cent of own resources, with an average 
of 18 per cent. Table 3.2 shows the percentages corresponding to each of the two subnational 
levels, and we can see the striking difference between municipalities and regions regarding 
provincial and municipal level in Argentina and Denmark, respectively.  
 
Table 3.2. Own-Resources of Intermediate and local levels of government as Percentage of 
total Country Tax Collection     
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010  AVG 
Argentina Prov. 21% 20% 20% 18% 17% 17% 18% 17% 17% 19% 18%  18% 
  Local 0,5% 0,5% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3%  0,33% 
Denmark Reg. 10% 10% 11% 11% 10% 10% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0%  7% 
 Local 21% 22% 23% 23% 22% 21% 21% 24% 25% 26% 27%  23% 
               
Sources: Own elaboration base on OECD Database (for Federal and provincial levels) and Ministerio de 
Economía, Dirección Nacional de Coordinación Fiscal con las Provincias (for municipalities only). 
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Argentina is more centralized given the low participation of provinces in the overall 
tax collection structure, and the almost insignificant participation of local 
governments. According to the data provided by the Argentine Ministry of Economy, 
municipalities represented on average 0.33 per cent between 2000 and 2010. In 
Denmark we can observed a turning point in 2007, when regions lost their taxation 
power. Since then, the regional level is financed by central government grants. 
Municipalities represent a share of 23 per cent in average of total tax resources, 
whereas Argentine provinces have an average of 18 per cent.   
 
3.4 Variable Four: Transfers 
Variables 2 and 3 do not show the total revenues at subnational levels’ disposal. 
Due to the process of decentralization operated in most countries, the fiscal structure 
and intergovernmental relations gets more complexity, and consequently a series of 
different mechanisms of intergovernmental transfers – usually called central or 
federal grants – are required in order to fix fiscal autonomy with policy 
decentralization. In this section, I will first analyse the transfers system in each 
country, considering the percentages of total central transfers according to the type 
of grants. Second, total subnational resources after transfers as a share of subnational 
and central total resources. And thirdly, I will consider transfers by type according to 
each kind of subnational units.  
Within the vast range of central transfers there are of two kinds: earmarked and 
non-earmarked transfers. Earmarked funds affect the expenditure autonomy of 
subnational governments, since these funds must be spent on specific tasks previously 
decided by the central government – whereas a non-earmarked one does not, 
increasing consequently the degree of subnational autonomy spending. The recent 
literature has developed a more complex categorization of central transfers systems60. 
 
60 See Mau, Niels Jørgen (2010) “Grant design in Denmark and factors behind the use of grant earmarking”, in Kim, 
Junghun, Jørgen Lotz and Niels Jørgen Mau, eds., General Grants versus Earmarked Grants Theory and Practice, 
The Copenhagen Workshop 2009, published by Korea Institute of Public Finance and the Danish Ministry of Interior 
and Health, pp. 285-317; Blom-Hansen, Jens (2010) “The fiscal federalism theory of grants: Some reflections from 
political science”, in Kim, Junghun, Jørgen Lotz and Niels Jørgen Mau, eds., General Grants versus Earmarked 
Grants Theory and Practice, The Copenhagen Workshop 2009, published by Korea Institute of Public Finance and 
the Danish Ministry of Interior and Health, pp. 107-125, OECD (1999), “Taxing powers of state and local 
government” [supra, n. 50].  
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However, in order to measure and compare fiscal decentralization, this paper will only 
consider the basic classification of earmarked and non-earmarked transfers.   
 
Subnational Resources (own-resources plus transfers) as percentage of total 
country resources 
As shown in Table 4.1, with all federal transfers, between 2000 and 2010, Argentine 
provinces increased the amount of total revenues at their disposal (including own 
resources) on average up to 48 per cent regarding the federal government61. According 
to Schwartz and Liuksila, between 1991 and 1995, percentages were similar as in the 
previous decade62. Subnational units in Denmark, instead, increased their total 
amount of resources on average up to 59 per cent– almost ten points of difference 
with Argentina. Adding transfers to own subnational levels’ resources, subnational 
levels significantly increased their total amount of resources at their disposal nearly 
the double. As Table 4.2 shows, both subnational levels in Denmark increased from 30 
per cent up to 59 per cent in average between 2000 and 2010, whereas the central 
level shows a proportionally inverse trend (from 70 to 41 per cent). 
 
Table 4.1. Argentina and Denmark. Subnational Government’s share of total country 
resources (after transfers) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010  AVG 
Denmark  55% 58% 58% 59% 58% 55% 57% 57% 59% 65% 68%  59% 
Argentina  n/d n/d 47% 47% 48% 49% 49% 48% 47% 50% 50%  48% 
              
Source: own compilation based on Argentine Ministry of Economy and OECD Statistics.  
 
 
Transfers by type 
 Despite the increase in resources due to central transfers, it is necessary to consider 
the nature and type of these grants. As stated before, earmarked and non-earmarked 
grants makes a difference in the degree of subnational spending autonomy. As shown 
in Table 4.2 there is a significant difference between both countries regarding the 
 
61 Data from 2012. Compilation based on National Direction of Fiscal Coordination with Provinces, Ministry of 
Economy of Argentina, databases, www.mecon.gov.ar/hacienda/dncfp/ and OECD Statistical Database, 
http://stats.oecd.org/. 
62 Schwartz and Liuksila [supra, n. 57] p. 390.  
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type of central grants: In Argentina, provinces enjoy more spending autonomy since 
non-earmarked grants represent on average 48 per cent of the total subnational 
resources (65 per cent of total federal transfers), whereas non-earmarked grants in 
Denmark represent 18 per cent of the total subnational resources (35 per cent of total 
central transfers). This autonomy ultimately translates into a further decision-making 
power regarding their available resources. 
  
 
Table 4.2. Argentina and Denmark. Own Resources and transfers by type as percentage of 
total subnational resources  
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 AVG 
Argentina              
Own-Res. n/d 26% 41% 38% 35% 35% 35% 34% 35% 36% 35% 41% 
Earm.  n/d 36% 10% 11% 8% 7% 8% 8% 8% 12% 14% 11% 
Non-Earm. n/d 38% 49% 51% 57% 58% 58% 58% 56% 52% 51% 48% 
Denmark               
Own-Res. 56% 57% 57% 57% 55% 55% 54% 42% 42% 40% 39% 50% 
Earm.  33% 32% 32% 32% 32% 32% 31% 32% 32% 32% 32% 32% 
Non-Earm. 11% 11% 11% 11% 13% 13% 15% 25% 26% 28% 29% 18% 
Source: own compilation based on Argentine Ministry of Economy and OECD Statistics. 
 
The Argentine system of transfer may be classified in two main categories: on the 
one hand, there is the so-called co-participation regime, a sharing-system grant 
legislated and recollected by central government and subsequently shared with the 
provinces, and on the other hand, there are a number of individual transfers from the 
national budget to provinces, with a clear and specific purpose to finance some policy 
areas (education, health, infrastructure, etc.). The evolution of fiscal 
intergovernmental relations shows an increase in federal transfers accompanied by a 
decrease in the total amounts of co-participation regime63. While in the beginnings of 
the 1980s, two-thirds of federal transfers came from the RCFI64, amounts of RCFI 
represent on average 68 per cent of total federal transfers between 2002 and 2012 
(Table #5). The remaining 32 per cent is complemented with other specific federal 
funds.  
 
 
63 Within these federal transfers, the most important are: Education Transference Funds, Infrastructure Fund, 
Provincial Road Fund, F.E.D.E.I. (Special Interior Electric Development Fund/Fondo Especial para el Desarrollo 
Eléctrico del Interior), FO.NA.VI. (National Housing Fund), ATN (National Treasury Contributions), the Basic 
Social Infrastructure Fund, and the most recent, the Federal Solidarity Fund (composed with 30% of export duties 
collected of soybean). 
64 Id., p. 401.  
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TABLE 4.5: Argentina. Evolution of Coparticipation and Others Federal Transfers (2000-2010)  
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010  AVG 
RCFI n/d 37% 64% 65% 70% 72% 71% 72% 70% 65% 62%  65% 
Other Transfers n/d 63% 36% 35% 30% 28% 29% 28% 30% 35% 38%  35% 
Source: own compilation based on Argentine Ministry of Economy  
 
As shown in Table 4.5, Co-participation regime (despite it decrease in the last 
years) remains the most important transfer from the centre. From a constitutional 
perspective, it is necessary to clarify that all taxes composing the Federal Tax Sharing 
System's fund belong in an equal measure to the federal government as well as the 
provinces. Hence, co-participated transfers cannot have a specific expenditure 
allocation determined by federal government. It is therefore a non-discretionary and 
non-earmarked transfer. This has not, however, prevented opportunist behaviours 
from the national government.  The municipal level instead covers 93% of its budgets 
through federal and provincial transfers, on average between 2000 and 2010 (only 6 
per cent of own resources). This is due mainly to the consequence of fiscal 
arrangement between both federal and provincial levels.  
In Denmark, we also find important changes after the 2007 municipal reform. As 
stated before, one of the main aims of the reform was to remove regional taxes and 
to introduce one general block grant, replacing the existing grants. Regions, since they 
cannot impose taxes, depend only on central grants. Consequently, regions are 
financed by central government grants and to some extent by municipalities through 
a small contribution when its inhabitants utilize the regional care system65. In 2007 
central grants surpassed subnational resources, reversing the relationship from 46 per 
cent of grants and 54 per cent of own taxes in 2006 to 58 per cent of grants and 42 
per cent of own taxes in 2007. Since then, central grants increased their share up to 
61 per cent in 2010. 
   
 
65 “All Danish inhabitants pay a recent introduced health tax (8 percent of the taxable income) to the central 
government which partly finances the central government grant to the regions” (LGDK [supra, n. 53] p. 15). 
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Regarding non-earmarked grants, we observe a systematic increase since 2007, 
whereas earmarked grants remain unchanged. Non-earmarked grants increase ten per 
cent in only one year, from 15 per cent up to 25 per cent and reaching a 29 per cent 
(almost a double) in 2010. On the contrary, earmarked grants range between 31 and 
33 per cent. Comparing the total amounts of earmarked and non-earmarked grants, 
we can observe, on the one hand, a trend in which both types of grants tend to be 
equated (in percentage of total grants amounts, observable in the lines on the left 
axis on Graph 4.1) and, on the other hand, an increase in the total amount of grants 
transferred (in billions of krones, columns in right axis on the graph).   
 
Graph 4.1. Evolution of Earmarked and Non-Earmarked Grants (Kr 
Bn and %) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD Statistics.  
 
 
Graph 4.1. Central Grants and Subnational Tax Revenue Evolution 
2000-2010 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on OECD Statistics.  
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Central grants by level of Government 
According to Graph 4.2, central grants transferred to regions decreased from 71 per 
cent in 2000 to 64 per cent in 2009. However, the total amount significantly increased  
in 2007, from 127 billion of kr. in 2006 up to 174 billion of kr. in 2007. These variations 
are due to two significant changes regarding the role of region in the public sector: 
First, regions are no longer able to levy any kind of tax and secondly, the 2007 reform 
removed some regional competencies (being transferred to the central and/or the 
municipal level). 
 
Graph 4.2. Central Grants by Level of Govt. (Muni. and Regions) (Kr Bn 
and %) 
 
Source: OECD Database and MAU 2010.  
 
3.5 Variable Five: Expenditure 
Decentralization of public spending is a worldwide trend, even in unitary 
countries66. In Argentina, the most important turning point in the evolution of public 
expending between levels of governments occurred at the beginning of the 1990s, 
when the federal government decentralized some competences, particularly 
education and public health. Provinces increased their public expenditure from 25% 
in 1986 to 38% in 199467 – just after the decentralization process mentioned above had 
operated. This trend has maintained over the following decades, in where subnational 
units represent 49 per cent in average between 2000 and 2009 (considering both 
 
66 Rodden [supra, n. 6]. 
67 World Bank (1996a) Argentina: Provincial Finances Study: Selected Issues in Fiscal Federalism, Volume I, 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank, p. 5.  
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intermediate and local levels). Under the period of analysis, in 2006 provinces reached 
the highest percentage in public expenditure (52 per cent), however, since then the 
trend began to decrease to 48 per cent in 2007, 47 in 2008 and 46 in 2009 (see Graph 
5.1). Municipalities, however, have maintained a share of 8 – 9 per cent during the 
whole period. 
This downward trend corresponds to a change in the state model since 2003, passing 
from a neoliberal state (introduced in the 90s) to a more interventionist state. 
Consequently, federal government began to be more engaged in public expenditure. 
These percentages are similar to other decentralized federations, such as Germany 
(38 per cent) and Switzerland (39 per cent)68. According to data processing based on 
OECD database, subnational levels in Denmark represented on average 62 per cent 
between 2000 and 201069. Regarding the subnational share of expenditure in the 
Danish case, different sources show similar percentages: Mau shows 62 per cent in 
200770, Mortensen indicates 61.8 in 200571, and OECD around 63.872 and 6273, whereas 
Blom-Hansen and Heeager fit local functions amounts to two-thirds of all public 
expenditure74. 
The difference between the two countries is striking. The average reached by 
Denmark in the period 2000-2010 is 62 per cent, whereas subnational governments in 
Argentina reached 49 per cent, a difference of thirteen points. Between 2006 and 
2010, when subnational governments in Argentina began to lose points in their share 
of total public expenditure, the difference with Danish subnational levels rose up to 
20 percent.  
 
 
68 Swenden [supra, n. 5], p. 109.  
69 Regarding the subnational share of expenditure in the Danes case, sources show similar percentages: Mau shows 
62 per cent in 2007 (Mau 2010 [supra, n. 59] p. 289), Mortensen indicates 61.8 in 2005 (Mortensen, Peter Bjerre 
(2014) “Udviklingen i de offentlige udgifter”, in Christiansen, Peter, ed., Budgetlægning og offentlige udgifter, 
København: Hans Reitzel, pp. 66-912, p. 87), around 63.8 (OECD 2011 “Government at a Glance 2011. Country 
Note: DENMARK”) or 62 (OECD 2013 “OECD Regions at a Glance 2013 – Denmark Profile”), whereas others fits 
local functions amount to two-thirds of all public expenditure (Blom-Hansen and Heeager 2010 [supra, n. 42] p. 
227).  
70 Mau 2010 [supra, n. 59] p. 289.  
71 Mortensen, Peter Bjerre (2014) “Udviklingen i de offentlige udgifter”, in Christiansen, Peter, ed., Budgetlægning 
og offentlige udgifter, København: Hans Reitzel, pp. 66-912, p. 87.  
72 OECD (2011) “Government at a Glance 2011. Country Note: DENMARK”.  
73 OECD 2013 “OECD Regions at a Glance 2013 – Denmark Profile”.  
74 Blom-Hansen and Heeager 2010 [supra, n. 42] p. 227.  
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Graph 5.1. Central Grants by Level of Govt. (Muni. and Regions) 
 
Source: Ministry of Economy of Argentina, databases, and OECD Statistical 
Database. 
 
Subnational Expenditures by Function and finality: How do subnational 
governments spend their money?  
As we seen in the previous chapter, in Argentina only a few transfers are conditioned 
to specific purposes: “Still, provinces and local jurisdictions enjoyed significant 
autonomy with respect to the amount, structure, execution, and supervision of various 
social services, including housing and education (except university)”75. Most of the 
competences allocated by the Constitution are concurrent between federal and 
subnational levels, especially the competences that revolve around the idea of a 
welfare state model – defined as “the complex of policies that, in one form or other, 
all rich democracies have adopted to ameliorate destitution and provide valued social 
goods and services”76. The competencies that this model of state encompasses focus 
on social policy areas, typically health, education, social security, housing, sanitation 
policies and the newest ones, such as environment and consumer protection. 
Through different process of decentralization, the federal level delegated the 
administration and implementation of these policies77, while it reserved the financing 
and establishment of general and nationwide minimum standards – however, those 
standards must be agreed with provinces before being implemented in their 
 
75 Schneider, Aaron (2004) “The Fiscal Sociology of Decentralisation: The impact of Decentralization on Tax 
Capacity and Pro-Poor Policy” in Gupta, K.R. (2004) Urban Development Debates in the New Millennium: Studies 
in Revisited Theories and Redefined Praxes, Vol. 1, New Delhi: Atlantic, pp. 115-182; see also Garman, Christopher, 
Stephan Haggard and Eliza Willis (2001) “Fiscal Decentralization…”, [supra, n. 12] p. 215.  
76 Schneider (2004) [supra, n. 74].  
77 Before the transfer processes took place, both educations and health functions were performed by the two levels 
in a parallel fashion. 
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jurisdictions. This logically increased the subnational share on consolidated public 
expenditure, and explains that the rise of subnational expenditure was inversely 
proportional to the decrease of federal spending in the same areas. 56 per cent of 
subnational budgets are destined to social services (on average, between 1991 and 
2009). And within this category, health represents 10.5 per cent and education 30 per 
cent, housing policies 4 per cent, promotion and social assistance 5 per cent and social 
security 2.7. In turn, municipalities have most of their share of public expenditure 
focused on urban services: 96.4 in 1986 and 93.3 in 199678.  
Denmark, in turn, “has one of the largest public sectors in the world – in relative 
terms”79 and most of the welfare services are provided by subnational units, especially 
municipalities since 2007. Central government collects almost 70 per cent of revenues 
but represents about 32 per cent of expenditures, “suggesting that most goods and 
services are provided by local governments–often using revenues transferred from the 
central level”80. 43 per cent of general government public expenditure was devoted 
to social protection, following by health (15 per cent) and education (13 per cent)81. 
At the subnational level, 78 per cent of subnational pubic investment was allocated 
to social protection82.  
 
3.6 Variable Six: Vertical Fiscal Imbalance  
The Vertical Fiscal Imbalance index helps us to answer in which degree subnational 
levels cover their expenses with own resources and with central transfers. So far, we 
have considered the amount and purposes of subnational public spending. When we 
asked to what extent subnational government cover their expenses, we were referring 
to an important issue within fiscal federalism: the fiscal imbalance. Fiscal imbalance 
arises when subnational governments do not raise enough resources to cover their 
expenditure needs83. In terms of Aldasoro and Seiferling, “Vertical fiscal imbalances 
attempt to measure the extent to which subnational governments' expenditures are 
 
78 World Bank [supra, n. 66] p. 5.  
79 Mau [supra, n. 59] p. 287; see also OECD 2011 [supra, n. 71], Rodden [supra, n. 6].  
80 OECD 2011 [supra, n. 71]. Danish government employs 28 per cent of the labour force (in 2008), corresponding 
76.20 per cent to subnational levels. 
81 Id.  
82 OECD 2013 [supra, n. 72]. 
83 Swenden [supra, n. 5].  
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financed through own revenues rather than transfers from the central government or 
borrowing by the subnational governments.”84 Fiscal imbalance could be vertical or 
horizontal. Horizontal fiscal imbalance appears when insufficiency to cover the public 
expenses differ between subnational units. This may occur when regional taxes are 
unequally spread or when per capita revenues and expenditures vary strongly from 
one unit to another85. There are, of course, others factors contributing to horizontal 
imbalance, such as the geographic characteristics of subnational units, population, 
etc.  
Fiscal imbalance is vertical when this subnational insufficiency regards the federal 
or central level. In the present article, I focus on vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI) only. 
Although there is no consensus regarding the way to measure vertical fiscal 
imbalances86, I have taken (following Swenden 2006 work) the average of subnational 
own-resources prior federal/central transfers as percentage of total country revenue 
and the percentage of subnational public expenditure after transfers as percentage of 
total country public expenditure (leaving aside the borrowing capacity of subnational 
units), all those data as average between 2000 and 2010. The VFI index arises as the 
ratio of total revenues and public expenditure according to the available official data 
gathered from countries’ Ministry of Economy and OECD databases. According to 
Swenden, when the ratio obtained is lower than 1.0, subnational units do not cover 
their expenses with their own resources (i.e., locally raised taxes). Conversely, if the 
ratio exceeds 1.0, subnational governments receive more money than they expend87. 
A ratio of 1.0 indicates a perfect vertical balance.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
84 Aldasoro, Iñaki and Mike Seiferling (2014) “Vertical Fiscal Imbalances and the Accumulation of Government 
Debt”, IMF Working Paper WP/14/209, New York: International Monetary Fund, p. 6.  
85 Swenden [supra, n. 5]. 
86 Aldasoro and Seiferling [supra, n. 83].  
87 Swenden [supra, n. 5], p. 112.  
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Table 6.1 –Vertical Fiscal Imbalance. Average 
2000-2010 
 Argentina Denmark 
Expenditure (after 
transfers) 49 62 
Revenues (prior transfers) 18 30 
VFI 0.37 0.48 
 
Source: Prepared by the author based on data 
supplied by Countries’ Ministry of Economy and OECD 
databases. 
 
Table 6.1 shows the Vertical Fiscal Imbalance index obtained for both countries. As 
it can be seen, VFI is higher in Argentina than in Denmark, meaning that provinces in 
Argentina are responsible for a high percentage of consolidated public expenditure 
but at the same time, they have an insufficient allocation of own resources. The 
difference between both countries is significant: 0.37 in Argentina against 0.48 in 
Denmark, a difference of almost ten points. However, the degree of VFI reached in 
both countries means that federal and central governments in both countries have 
decentralized spending more than revenues88. In any case, VFI is a useful index to 
confirm the dependence of subnational governments on federal or central transfers to 
afford their responsibilities. These findings confirm the general trend, according to 
which VFI is common in most of countries.   
 
4. Some Preliminary Conclusions and Avenues for New Research Lines   
 
Empirical evidence has demonstrated that a unitary country (Denmark) is much 
more decentralized than a federal one (Argentina). Previous works have pointed out 
the high degree of decentralization that not only Denmark, but also the Scandinavian 
countries, have achieved, concluding that their degree of decentralization is even 
higher than federal countries in the world. Rodden, for instance, ranked Denmark as 
the third-most decentralized country in a sample of 29 countries. OECD’s works have 
achieved the same conclusion regarding the OECD countries89.  
 
88 Eyraud, Luc and Lusine Lusinyan (2011) “Decentralizing Spending More than Revenue: Does It Hurt Fiscal 
Performance?” IMF Working Paper WP/11/226, September, New York: International Monetary Fund. 
89 Rodden [supra, n. 6]. 
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However, what this paper attempts to highlight are the specific differences (and 
similarities) with a country from a different region and with a totally different 
institutional framework, analysing each of the most important variables within the 
broad concept of decentralization and figuring out the factors underling those 
numerical indicators. According to Table 1, Denmark is more decentralized than 
Argentina in almost all indicators, except for the participation of subnational units in 
the implementation of general public policies (58 per cent in Argentina against 42 per 
cent in Denmark). The other difference are the amounts of non-earmarked transfers.  
In comparing both countries, we can draw four preliminary conclusions.  
 
4.1 A tentative classification of distribution of competences 
 
The distribution of competences in Denmark fits an “integrational model”90 or a “Type 
II” jurisdiction according to Hooghe and Marks91, in which local governments’ role is 
to implement national policies. In this respect, municipalities were designed by 
central government to implement certain policies. The distribution of tasks between 
central and subnational levels and between intermediate (regions) and local levels fall 
into a separation of powers category or a coordinate authority model of IGR. 
Therefore, “there is no system of subordination between the regions and the 
municipalities, as they possess different tasks and responsibilities”92. In sum, Danish 
local governments fall into a devolution type of administrative decentralization from 
the formal institutional framework, understood as “hierarchical and functional 
distribution of powers and functions between central and non-central governmental 
units”93, but with strong federal practices falling into Wright’s overlapping authority 
model. The Argentinean system, on the other hand, falls into a cooperative federalism 
or an overlapping IGR authority model, in which most of the competences are 
concurrent between the three levels. In the institutional arrangement in Argentina, 
consensus with the provinces is required to implement national goals in almost all 
public policies.  
 
90 Kjellberg 1995, quoted by Blom-Hansen and Heeager 2011 [supra, n. 42].  
91 Hooghe and Marks (2003) “Unraveling the Central State, but How?” [supra, n. 41].  
92 LGDK [supra, n. 53] p. 4. 
93 Cohen and Peterson [supra, n. 3] p. 29.  
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Intermediate levels play an almost insignificant role in delivering public policies in 
Denmark, especially after the 2007 Reform. The same could be said about local levels 
in Argentina. However, most of the social public policies are delivered by the 
intermediate level (provinces). The municipal level in Argentina has two features that 
differentiate it from the Danish case: on the one hand, there are no a standardized 
systems regarding the nature and functions municipalities should deliver94. In 
practice, municipalities lack from financial autonomy and have only few competences, 
particularly in respect of social policies. In Denmark, the 2007 reform “can be seen as 
the end of a long process towards a standardized system of two levels of local 
government. All over the country, municipalities are now in charge of the same set of 
local functions”95. First, the former 271 municipalities were amalgamated into 98 new 
municipalities, and the previous 14 counties were abolished and 5 new regions were 
installed.   
In Argentina, on the contrary, municipalities’ roles ultimately depend on each 
province. However, their role is confined to deliver local traditional utilities (water 
supply, refuse collection, local roads, street lighting, etc.) in almost all provinces. In 
a few provinces, municipalities deliver services such as education – still, their share 
in public expenditure is quite reduced96. 
 
4.2 Federalism Does Not Mean Decentralization: Formal vs Informal Institutions  
 
One early conclusion is that institutional decentralization does not always coincide 
with the actual degree of decentralization. This fact suggests the differences between 
formal institutions and actual practices. In both cases, informal institutions seem to 
 
94 The national constitution (reformed in 1994) expressly guaranteed the autonomy of municipalities, obliging 
provinces to ensure municipal autonomy in their respective constitutions. However, provinces are free to “ruling its 
scope and content”, as long as they respect the local autonomy “regarding the institutional, political, administrative, 
economic and financial aspects” (art. 123, National Constitution). 
95 Blom-Hansen and Heeager 2011 [supra, n. 42] p. 225. The authors here utilize the term “local” in the same way I 
use “subnational”, since they are referring to both, regions and municipalities.  
96 Altavilla, Cristian (2015b) “Asignación de competencias y atribución de facultades tributarias en el régimen 
municipal argentino. Alcances y límites del poder tributario municipal”, in Hernández, Antonio, Ernesto Rezk and 
Marcelo Capello, eds. Propuestas para fortalecer el Federalismo Argentino, Academia Nacional de Derecho y 
Ciencias Sociales de Córdoba, Instituto de Federalismo, pp. 413- 448.  
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be more important than formal institutions97. For instance, in Denmark the 
associations of local governments and the patterns of negotiated agreements between 
levels of governments are not contemplated neither in the Constitution nor in the 
ordinary legislation. However, these agreements have preceded every 
decentralization process. As Blom-Hansen has stated, “the arrangement was not 
formalized but consisted of informal negotiations between the central government 
and local government representatives”98.  
Moreover, in Denmark – as a unitary country – the formal institutional framework 
does not account for any institutional provision of subnational units’ participation at 
the central decision-making arena nor is the parliament’s composition based on 
territory, i.e., electoral districts do not correspond to the boundaries of territorial 
governments. If this is the case, “more territorial bargaining might be expected than 
in systems without districts”99. This means that subnational levels do not have 
institutional veto over central decisions. However, contrary to Rodden’s opinion, and 
despite that in the Danish political system no territorial unit plays a formal role in the 
central government’s decision procedure, subnational levels (especially 
municipalities) have succeeded in achieving a greater decentralization. The political 
organization of Denmark is characterized by the “use of agreements as an alternative 
to parliamentary regulation”100, in which local government associations (such as the 
Local Government Denmark agency) have a privileged position, despite that their 
agreements are not legally binding for local governments. Denmark, however, shows 
some “federal practices”, especially regarding the preceding negotiations before the 
operation of any change in the vertical distribution of policies and competences.  
This particular practice has been highlighted by several scholars, and given the 
importance that local associations have acquired in these processes over time, they 
were defined as the “second chamber”101. These federal practices turn the Danish 
 
97 Informal institutions are defined by Helmke and Levitsky as “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are 
created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke, G. and S. Levitsky (2004) 
“Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda”, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 2, No. 4, Dec., 
pp. 725-740, p. 727). 
98 Blom-Hansen, Jens (1998) “Macroeconomic Control of Local Governments in Scandinavia: The Formative 
Years”, Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 21 - No. 2, pp. 129-159, p. 148.  
99 Rodden [supra, n. 6] p. 490.  
100 Blom-Hansen, Jens (2010) “The fiscal federalism theory of grants…” [supra, n. 59] p. 244. 
101 LGDK [supra, n. 53] p. 11.  
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polity in a federal one. However, considering the way in which decentralization took 
place, administrative decentralization with a strong control and supervision from the 
central government, rather than political decentralization would be the most proper 
way to classify the Danes case. Regions, on the contrary, had never played any 
important role. That was pointed out with the 2007 reform. It is clear that the level 
that matters in the Danish system is the local one. This is interesting regarding the 
“informal” federalist system mentioned earlier – Would it be possible to constitute a 
municipal-based federal system?  
In Argentina, provinces have had an undisputed role in the process of 
decentralization. Despite that, the process would seem to have a top-down trend, as 
provinces ultimately must accept the competences transferred. The federal 
government in Argentina could be characterized as the first mover in negotiation 
processes, a situation of decision-making similar to that described by the battle of the 
sexes or Stackelberg’s followers in game theory102. According to the pattern of the 
negotiations process (most of them, after the decision of the central government to 
decentralize), provinces have preferred political decentralization (decision-making 
autonomy over public policies) with strong funding from the national government.  
From a federal perspective, and considering the results of this work, “federalism 
does not necessarily entail greater independent authority for subnational governments 
over taxes, expenditures, or anything else”103, therefore, “not always unitary 
countries have a centralized government or, inversely, federal countries have a 
decentralized one”104. Indeed, many federal countries have a very low degree of 
subnational tax autonomy105. Argentina fits n this classification, and what is most 
striking is that subnational units consented this outcome. Despite that, the 
Constitution in Argentina allocates most of the competences as concurrent and several 
dispositions tend to prevent federal imposition, subnational units have resigned much 
of their constitutional powers. A possible causal explanation could be the high 
 
102 Altavilla, Cristian (2016) Conflicto y Coordinación política en las Relaciones Intergubernamentales en 
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Thesis, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Córdoba, Argentina. 
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asymmetries between provinces, in which most of them have a lesser degree of 
development than a few other provinces and its logical preference is redistribution of 
fiscal resources from the centre rather than more fiscal autonomy. 
 
4.3 The Role of Subnational Governments in Decentralization Processes 
 
According to Rodden “federalism is not a particular distribution of authorities between 
governments, but rather a process – structured by a set of institutions – through which 
authority is distributed and redistributed”106. The idea of contract or covenant 
between different states arises, meaning that the parties involved must fulfil some 
obligation to one another: “If central government can get everything it wants from 
local governments by simple acts of administrative fiat, it makes little sense to see 
the two as engaged in a contractual, or federal, relationship”107. 
The author also highlights the importance of underlining how and why federal 
contracts are made in the first place. A top-down decentralization is expected to be 
the case in a unitary system. However, the Argentine federalism – in which, in theory, 
the process of decentralization should take a bottom-up tendency – experienced a 
process of decentralization with the same top-down trend. The 1970 process of 
decentralization was made by a de facto government and the 1992 process of 
decentralization was practically imposed on provinces; in both cases, consultation and 
negotiation with provinces was scarce, in a “mix of conviction, foreign pressure, 
political opportunism, and shortsighted fiscal moves”108.  
Denmark, like the rest of the Scandinavian countries, shows a long-rooted tradition 
of decentralization of functions and competencies – with important antecedents 
between 1945 and 1970. A further decentralization took place in the late 1970s109 and 
“paved the way for a massive transfer of functions from the central government to 
the new municipalities and countries, concurrently with the expansion of the Danish 
 
106 Rodden [supra, n. 6] p. 489. 
107 Id., p. 489.   
108 Tommasi, Mariano (2002) “Federalism in Argentina and the Reforms of the 1990s”, Working Paper No. 147, 
August. Center for research on economic development and policy reform. Stanford: Stanford University, p. 68.  
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welfare state”110. Following the latest municipal reform of 2007, the level of municipal 
autonomy was strengthened even more111, but at the same time, the process brought 
a greater financial control by central government. Nevertheless, even in this aspect, 
the control was exercised through annual agreements with local governments in a 
system known as “budgetary cooperation”112 within the traditional Scandinavian 
“corporatism”113. As a consequence of this process, a large number of welfare tasks 
are currently delivered by local governments, and all these tasks are highly 
decentralized114. All in all, Danish municipalities eventually came to deliver almost all 
welfare services – the Danish welfare state is, therefore, a local welfare state. In all 
these reforms, at the same time, the central government laid down the general 
framework115.  
Argentina, on the contrary, has experienced a process of centralization or 
recentralization in some important areas, especially in fiscal terms. This is also a 
distinctive feature in Latin-America116. The introduction of the state welfare model in 
1940 gave prevalence to the central government in decision-making, implementation 
and financing of public policies, as  was the case in the United States during the New 
Deal. However, since the decade of the 1970s, some processes of decentralization 
took place in two important areas of social policies: education and health care. These 
processes were deepened in the beginning of the 1990s, when federal government 
fully decentralized the implementation and decision-making of these two social 
policies. Since then, provinces are in charge of delivering and financing most of the 
social policies areas: education, health care, housing policies, whereas the federal 
government reserved to itself the role of financing and the establishment of 
nationwide minimum standards.  
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Going back to the basics of IGR in Denmark, the 1970 reform meant a turning point 
in which IGR started from scratch117. The decentralization process followed a top-
down trend, but started in the very beginning with robust patterns of negotiation, 
balancing central control and local autonomy. Consequently, and according to Blom-
Hansen, the reason for the choice of a cooperative strategy rather than a coercive 
control from the centre “cannot be found in institutional legacies”118. In this seminal 
moment of Danish IGR, the local government associations “seem to have been opposed 
to the idea [of central control], but accepted cooperative means of control as the 
lesser of two evils”119. Most important is that these informal practices were rooted in 
a long time period and they seem strong enough to prevent some modifications from 
the central level unilaterally – despite that the central government has the authority 
to do it.  
On the other side of the coin, these processes unveiled that municipalities’ 
functions were designed according to the central government’s needs: in all processes, 
central government was free to shape local government according to its perceived 
needs120. While this process brought more local autonomy, at the same time it implied 
more control from the centre: “Denmark is the third-most decentralized country in 
the world […] – even more decentralized than the United States – though the central 
government tightly regulates virtually every aspect of local finance”121.  
In Argentina it seems more evident that subnational units preferred more 
expenditure decentralization rather than more tax autonomy. Indeed, provinces have 
voluntarily resigned their constitutionally guaranteed autonomy tax, in order to allow 
federal government to levy almost all taxes in the country. These agreements implied 
a resignation of their respective municipalities too. But at the same time, provinces 
gained in political autonomy, being free to decide which policies implement and how. 
A key factor could be found in the horizontal asymmetries that characterizes this 
federation. After these agreements, provincial taxation power only represented 18 
per cent of total country fiscal resources. However, provinces have managed to get 
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118 Id., 152.  
119 Id., 151.  
120 Blom-Hansen and Heeager 2010 [supra, n. 42] p. 225.  
121 Rodden [supra, n. 6] p. 483.  
49 
 
more federal resources which are to a large extent not targeted to any specific 
purpose. While provinces gain in political decentralization in exchange for fiscal 
centralization, municipalities – without a say in the process – lost in both aspects. 
They lost virtually their tax autonomy and remain highly dependent on provincial 
resources. 
Another factor explaining decentralization in Argentina in the recent decades is the 
increasing international pressure to decentralize governance. In general terms, 
federal government decided to transfer public policies to provinces in order to fill 
international conditions for borrowing international loans and to stabilize federal 
public finances. In turn, provinces agreed in decentralized public policies that would 
be translated in more political power, however, with less fiscal autonomy. Federal 
and provincial (at least the majority of them) preferences were aligned in this 
equilibrium point. This explanation can be applied not only to understand recent 
decentralization (as well as recentralization) processes122, but also the very origin of 
the Argentine federation123.  
 
4.4 The intergovernmental dilemma: between central control and local 
autonomy 
 
 According to the previous statement, subnational units in Argentina (mainly, 
provinces) are less controlled by the central level than Danish subnational units 
(municipalities). Subnational levels in Denmark are in charge of implementing and 
partially financing almost all social policies. However, in doing so they have to 
conform to central government general standards.  
When decentralization of competencies to subnational units occurred in Denmark, 
a simultaneous economic deterioration followed, and that fact pushed central 
government to control the macroeconomic situation, by controlling local 
governments124. However, worthy of note is that macroeconomic control was carried 
 
122 Altavilla (2016) [supra, n. 95] and (2015a) “Variables Políticas en la [Re]Distribución de Recursos Fiscales entre 
distintos niveles de Gobiernos”, Revista Perspectivas de Políticas Públicas, Year 3, N° 7 (July-Dec.), pp. 13-41. 
123 cf. Gibson, Edward and Tulia Falleti (2004) “Unity by the Stick: Regional Conflict and the Origins of Argentine 
Federalism” in Gibson, Edward, ed., (2004) Federalism and Democracy in Latin America, Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, pp. 226-254.  
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out through agreements with local governments associations, in a system known as 
the “budgetary cooperation”. Moreover, central government has never imposed 
coercive measures on local governments (with very few exceptions), instead periodical 
negotiations have been used, at least from the 1970s125. In short, Denmark, like the 
“Scandinavian countries have been able to radically decentralize their public sectors 
without losing the ability to control macroeconomic performance through public 
income and expenditure” establishing institutions “to coordinate economic activity 
levels at the local level with macroeconomic policy goals at the central level”126. 
A key factor to better understand whether or not subnational units enjoy political 
authority would be to determine which level of government has decision-making 
authority. This is difficult to measure. However, in general terms, central government 
in Denmark has the power to impose its desired policy goals. There is an 
“intergovernmental dilemma” in which “local governments have a certain degree of 
autonomy at the same time as the central government has relatively clear policy goals. 
This means that if central guidelines are to be implemented, lower levels of 
governments must be coaxed or forced to comply”127. This intergovernmental 
interaction fits well within Wright’s inclusive authority model. However, the actual 
way in which Danish IGRs develop in practice include elements of the overlapping 
authority model, due to the bargaining process between central government and 
associations of local governments through informal “corporatist agreements”. From 
an institutional perspective (formal institutions), we must be aware that these 
agreements are not legally binding, being in consequence mere recommendations, 
and complemented with legal regulations from the central government128. 
Another way in which central government could exercise control over subnational 
units is by means of earmarked or task-related central transfers129. The role of 
subnational governments as “agencies of the central government” explains the 
existence of many central funds as conditioned to specific purposes. The constant 
tension between local autonomy and central control could be identified in the 
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character of central grants. As Mau explains, “there are two motives on the Central 
Government agenda: supporting local-level accountability and maintaining influence 
on the part of the central level”130. Moreover, Denmark has chosen a decentralized 
welfare state model which means, on the one hand, that most of the welfare services 
are delivered by local governments (specifically, the municipal level), but on the other 
hand, it implies that most of the welfare services have the nature of national rather 
than local public goods131. 
There is a great difference in both countries regarding the types of central grants. 
First, Argentine provinces depend more on central resources, since their own-
resources represent 41 per cent in average between 2000 and 2010, whereas Danish 
subnational levels have 50 per cent in average of own-resources. However, in the last 
decades, the share of subnational own-resources has decreased since 2007 (from 54 
per cent in 2006 to 39 per cent in 2010). Looking at column 4 in Table 1, we can 
observe that despite Argentine provinces are more dependent on central grants, a 
major percentage of them are non-earmarked, representing 48 per cent of total 
subnational resources, against 11 per cent of earmarked grants (on average between 
2000 and 2010). In the ten-year period, the Danish case shows a higher percentage of 
earmarked grants, representing 32 per cent, against 18 per cent of non-earmarked 
ones. However, it should be noticed that in the evolution of these ten years, non-
earmarked grants have increased, if we consider that in 2000 they represented 11 per 
cent and in 2010 they reached up to 29 per cent (almost reaching the same percentage 
of earmarked grants). This tendency could be translated into more political autonomy 
for municipalities, especially in the decision making of how expend their money. Still, 
institutional features give predominance to the central government in the decision-
making process, which is in charge of designing, among other functions, the general 
guidelines. 
The large share of non-earmarked grants in Argentina could be explained by the 
presence of the co-participation regime, which was classified as a non-earmarked 
grant. Due to the fact that this regime was a consequence of negotiations between 
levels of government (federal and provincial) over constitutional concurrent tax 
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competences, the funds generated within the regime could not be targeted or 
earmarked to any specific activity or expenditure.  On the other hand, there are a 
large number of specific federal transfers related to specific activities and oriented 
to finance them (such as education, public health, housing, electricity, etc.), but in 
overall terms, they represent a lesser share in the total amount transferred to 
provinces.  
 
4.5 Avenue for new research lines 
 
In short, subnational units in Argentina enjoy a wealth of political authority with a 
reduced fiscal power (self-renunciation), while subnational units in Denmark enjoy 
greater administrative and fiscal power in delivering and financing public policies, yet 
the central government maintains an important coordinating and supervising role: 
While, on the one hand, “Scandinavian local governments are stronger in 
administrative and fiscal capacity than their counterparts in all the other West 
European countries”132, on the other hand, central government has recentralized 
decision-making133. Although it is true that subnational units enjoy power in the 
decision-making process, central government is able to impose guidelines to be 
followed (be it by agreements or by imposition). Subnational units enjoy some 
freedom to decide as long as the central government does not impose any guidelines.   
Throughout this paper, some preliminary conclusions have been reached. However, 
future research lines have been opened. The key to understanding political 
decentralization is to figure out which level of government has the decision-making 
power over a given public policy. Otherwise, according to the theoretical framework, 
it would be an administrative decentralization in its different types (and degrees). 
Measuring decision-making power is a difficult task, but not impossible. Henderson134 
and Rodden135 have made progress in this direction. However, this study encourages 
an interdisciplinary dialogue among legal and political science disciplines leading to a 
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common conceptualisation of decentralization, a term that still remains vague and 
indistinct. Another way to understand the functioning of IGR is to deepen the study 
on interests, perceptions and resources of the involved actors (central and subnational 
levels), to better understand why and how decentralization has occurred with special 
attention to the different processes of negotiations between levels of government, 
and the strategies chosen by the involved actors.   
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